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Coercive Trade Policy†
By Vincent Anesi and Giovanni Facchini*
Coercion is used by one government (the “sender”) to influence the 
trade practices of another (the “target”). We build a  two-country 
trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or 
 channeled through a “weak” international organization  without 
enforcement powers. We show that unilateral coercion may be 
 ineffective because signaling incentives lead the sender to demand 
a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to the target. If 
the sender can instead commit to the international organization’s 
 dispute settlement mechanism, then compliance is more likely 
because the latter places a cap on the sender’s incentives to signal 
its resolve. (JEL D74, D82, F12, F53)
In international trade disputes, coercion is often used against governments whose trade practices are deemed unfair. Trade coercion occurs when a “sender 
 government” makes a demand backed by threats to use retaliatory sanctions against 
a “target government” if the latter does not acquiesce to this demand. There are 
 typically two distinct methods of trade coercion: it can be exercised unilaterally (e.g., 
Eaton and Engers 1992) or through multilateral institutions (e.g., GATT and WTO). 
In the case of unilateral coercion, the sender government makes a demand and (if 
necessary) retaliates one-sidedly, unconstrained by international  obligations.1 In the 
case of multilateral coercion, the sender uses instead an international institution’s 
framework for trade dispute resolution.2
While a small body of empirical literature has studied trade coercion—and 
in  particular whether multilateral organizations like the GATT or WTO can 
1 A typical example was Section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act, which allowed the United States to impose 
unilateral sanctions on countries whose trade practices were found to be unfair to US interests. This clause was 
invoked in several occasions—for instance, in the much publicized dispute with Japan over automobiles in 1995, 
in which the United States essentially bypassed the WTO and imposed sanctions unilaterally (e.g., Puckett and 
Reynolds 1996, Schoppa 1999). 
2 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism is the leading institution of this kind, and since its inception, it has 
handled hundreds of cases. Several preferential trade agreements also include similar institutions. See, for instance, 
NAFTA’s Dispute Settlement Process or MERCOSUR’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism. 
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increase the chance of a sender government obtaining concessions from targets 
(e.g., Busch  2000, Pelc 2010, Busch and Reinhardt 2000)—few if any formal 
 analyses explicitly  incorporate both the coercion process itself and the role of the 
 institutions through which coercion is channeled. The purpose of this paper is to 
contribute toward filling this gap, by analyzing the strategic incentives underlying 
trade  coercion under three different institutional settings. In particular, we ask two 
main questions: how can international trade institutions achieve their objectives 
if defendants can reject adverse rulings with impunity? Given international trade 
institutions’ limited enforcement powers, is unilateral or multilateral coercion more 
effective in inducing the target country to concede?
To address these questions, we set up a model depicting a dispute between two 
states, Home and Foreign, in which the Foreign government is dissatisfied with 
the trade policy implemented by the Home government. A key feature of trade 
 coercion is the target government’s lack of information on the sender govern-
ment’s  domestic political constraints (e.g., Eaton and Engers 1999, Busch and 
Reinhardt 2000, Bagwell and Staiger 2005, Beshkar and Bond 2017). To capture 
this idea, we  assume  that the political pressure exerted by the import-competing 
sector on the government in Foreign is private information and is only known by the 
Foreign  government. This political pressure plays a key role in shaping its level of 
resolve— i.e., the severity of its trade sanctions against the Home government—in 
a potential trade war.
Appraising the actual effectiveness of an international organization (IO) in 
 dispute settlement requires knowing what would happen if that institution did not 
exist—i.e., if there were no framework of rules governing trade coercion. For this 
reason, the first setting we examine is one in which unilateral coercion is the only 
option. The game begins with the Foreign government making a demand. The 
Home government can concede (ending the game with the implementation of the 
demanded tariff), or reject it (triggering a retaliatory trade war). In other words, it 
must decide which concessions are acceptable, that is, which tariff changes it would 
prefer to make rather than face Foreign’s trade sanctions. Since the precise nature of 
these sanctions is uncertain and crucially depends on the privately observed level of 
resolve of the Foreign government, the latter has incentives to signal high levels of 
resolve by making excessive demands about the concessions required from Home 
to avoid retaliatory measures. Our characterization of equilibrium outcomes in this 
case reveals that such incentives lead the Foreign government to make requests that 
the Home government will not meet, thus causing a retaliatory trade war—even 
when there exist mutually advantageous policy concessions.
As we will show, a key factor in determining whether concessions can be 
obtained with multilateral coercion is the extent to which the sender government 
can commit not to bypass the dispute settlement process of the IO through which 
coercion is  channeled. To model the different strategic situations that may arise 
from differ ences in the sender’s ability to commit to the IO, we will examine two 
distinct variants of the previous model. In the first, the Foreign government is not 
allowed to bypass the IO’s dispute settlement process. As a result, multilateral 
 coercion is its only option  available. Dispute settlement is modeled by allowing 
the Foreign government to make a demand to the Home government prior to the IO 
VOL. 11 NO. 3 227ANESI AND FACCHINI: COERCIVE TRADE POLICY
ruling. This  assumption is intended to capture, e.g., the consultations stage of WTO 
 disputes. If the Home government does not concede to the Foreign  government’s 
demand, the IO issues its ruling, whereas it remains inactive otherwise. As our aim 
is to  investigate the  effectiveness of weak international trade institutions—namely 
those that have no enforcement power and rely on the sender government itself 
to implement any  retaliatory measures—the Home government is allowed not to 
 comply with the  ruling, thus triggering a trade war with the Foreign government. 
Our analysis shows that commitment to the IO’s ruling makes concessions more 
likely. Intuitively, the potential IO ruling places a cap on the Foreign government’s 
incentives to signal its resolve with high demands. This results in the latter  making 
more moderate requests, which can be accepted by Home. Compared with the 
 unilateral-coercion case above, this finding provides a possible explanation for the 
empirical evidence (e.g., Busch 2000, Pelc 2010) indicating that, although neither 
GATT nor WTO have  enforcement powers, a target of trade coercion by the United 
States is  significantly less likely to concede when coercion is unilateral than when 
it is multilateral.
In the second variant of the model, the Foreign government is only partially 
 committed to the IO’s dispute settlement process, in the sense that it can choose 
between unilateral and multilateral coercion in an additional stage at the  beginning 
of the game, committing itself to that choice.3 This setting captures the  environment 
created by Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. In fact, this provision enabled 
the president to impose sanctions unilaterally against unfair trade practices, 
 eliminating the need to observe existing international obligations (e.g., Puckett and 
Reynolds 1996). We show that the mere availability of the unilateral option  prevents 
the foreign government from obtaining concessions in equilibrium. In fact, using 
multilateral coercion when unilateral coercion is available is  perceived as a sign 
of the foreign government’s weakness. Hence, incentives to signal higher  levels 
of resolve to the Home government will lead the Foreign government to make 
 unilateral demands which, as discussed above, cannot be accepted in equilibrium.
A large body of literature has studied international trade agreements as  equilibria 
of infinitely-repeated prisoner-dilemma games, in which deviations from the 
(implicit) agreements are followed by indefinite play of high-tariff Nash equilibria. 
Papers in that literature study how international organizations’ dispute settlement 
 procedures can facilitate cooperation—e.g., Riezman (1991); Hungerford (1991); 
Maggi (1999); Ludema (2001); Klimenko, Ramey, and Watson (2008); Limão and 
Saggi (2008); Bagwell (2009); and Park (2011). Although strategic incentives in 
our paper do not rely on long-run interactions, our analysis shares some  important 
 features with Bagwell (2009) and Park (2011). In particular, Bagwell (2009) 
 develops a two-country repeated game in which each government, as the sender 
in our model, possesses some private information about the extent of the political 
 pressures it is confronted with. He shows that trade agreements with weak bind-
ings (i.e., maximal tariff levels) are preferable to agreements with strong bindings 
(i.e., precise tariff levels). Interestingly, if private information is persistent through 
3 As we will discuss in Section IB, this assumption is consistent with empirical evidence on US trade coercion. 
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time, then signaling incentives, which resemble those of our  unilateral-coercion 
game, may undermine the Nash-reversion threat supporting a cooperative equi-
librium. Indeed, in order not to be perceived as “weak,” governments may resist 
 applying optimal  tariffs, below their bound levels. Park (2011), like us, shows that 
an  international trade  organization without enforcement powers may play an effec-
tive role in  preventing trade wars, but the reason is different. The author considers a 
 two-country repeated game with imperfect private monitoring, in which each coun-
try only observes an (imperfect) private signal about the other country’s  protection 
levels. In the absence of an IO, the private nature of the signals about their oppo-
nents’ policies restricts the punishment schemes that the countries can use to sus-
tain cooperation in  equilibrium. Observing both countries’ private signals, the IO 
decides whether a violation has occurred and then tells them to initiate a punishment 
phase based on its decision. Park shows that, despite its lack of coercive power, 
the IO can help sustain the cooperative  equilibrium by changing the nature of the 
punishment-triggering signals from private to public, thus relaxing informational 
constraints on optimal  punishment schemes.
Most papers in the literature reviewed so far model trade dispute settlement as a 
set of conditions imposed on the off-the-equilibrium-path punishments that  follow 
 deviations, not explicitly as a coercion game like ours. One  notable  exception is 
the model of sanctions developed by Eaton and Engers (1992). In their  framework, 
a sender and a target country interact repeatedly under perfect  information, and 
the sender is able to commit for a limited period of time to carry out a sanction, 
costly for both parties involved, if the target does not acquiesce to a sender’s 
 minimum request. They find that the threat of sanctions can be  effective in  obtaining 
 concessions from the target, even though sanctions are costly to the sender and 
not actually used in  equilibrium. In a follow-up paper, Eaton and Engers (1999), 
they show how  asymmetric information about senders and targets may  generate 
 equilibria  in which sanctions are imposed by the sender on the equilibrium path, 
either to  maintain its reputation for toughness or because it cannot  discriminate 
between complaisant and stubborn targets. Our approach to coercion differs 
from theirs in two important respects. First, we ask a different question. They 
are  concerned with explaining why sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, can be 
 effective in achieving senders’  objectives in the absence of third parties to enforce 
 agreements between  governments. In  contrast, we are concerned with explaining 
how the  presence of even “weak” IOs can have a significant impact on coercion 
outcomes. Second, even our  unilateral-coercion benchmark approaches coercion 
from a  different  perspective. Eaton and Engers’ (1992, 1999) arguments require 
repeated  interactions: if the sender dealt with the target only once, then it would 
have no incentive to use costly sanctions or to maintain a reputation. Our aim is to 
capture different strategic  incentives, not channeled through long-run interactions. 
In our framework, although the game will not be repeated, the sender government is 
prepared to use trade sanctions because it is dissatisfied with the target’s deviation 
from an existing trade agreement and, in the absence of a new agreement, increasing 
its tariffs would be profitable. As it seeks to obtain as favorable terms as possible, 
threats of sanctions signal its resolve in case a trade war could not be avoided. 
While such signaling incentives are conducive to inefficient trade wars, we show 
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that in the presence of an IO, an agreement is reached even without a ruling and 
sanctions are not implemented on the equilibrium path. As discussed in Section IV, 
this is consistent with empirical evidence on trade disputes.4
A recent literature has taken an incomplete-contracts approach to international 
trade agreements and dispute settlement—e.g., Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger 
(2007); Beshkar (2010); Beshkar (2016); Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010); Maggi 
and Staiger (2011); and Beshkar and Bond (2017). Its main focus is on the design 
of optimal institutions for international trade and dispute settlement in various 
 informational/contractual environments.5 In contrast, the IO’s dispute settlement 
procedure is the main exogenous variable in our model. Our aim is not to study the 
normative aspects of trade institutions but, instead, to provide a positive theory of 
how commitment to such institutions may affect trade coercion outcomes.
In the related context of international conflict resolution, Hörner, Morelli, 
and Squintani (2015) also shows that an IO without enforcement powers can be 
 effective. More precisely, the authors consider a dispute between two players over 
some  positive surplus that shrinks if they engage in a war, the outcome of which is 
 determined by their privately observed types (strong or weak). The authors  compare 
the optimal mechanisms that minimize the probability of war under two different 
third-party-intervention settings: arbitration, under which a third party collects 
information privately and makes binding decisions on the outcome of the dispute; 
and mediation, under which the third party also collects information but can only 
make unenforceable recommendations. Interestingly they find that, despite her lack 
of enforcement power, a mediator is as effective as an arbitrator in preventing wars. 
In contrast to our model in which the IO’s ruling is exogenously fixed, it is the 
 mediator’s ability to use sufficiently sophisticated recommendation strategies that 
allows her to circumvent the unenforceability constraint in their model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the model, while 
Section II presents the main results of our analysis. In Section III, we discuss the 
substantive implications of our results and relate them to the existing empirical 
 evidence. Section IV concludes.
I. The Model
The goal of this section is twofold. We start by presenting the basic structure of 
the economy and lay out next a simple model of trade coercion.
4 We discuss a dynamic extension of our model that would also capture the governments’ long-run incentives 
in Section IV. Other recent examples are Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Martin and Vergote (2008), and Rosendorff 
(2005), who analyze repeated tariff games in which, as in our model, governments have private information about 
their relative valuations of import-competing sectors. 
5 Gilligan, Johns, and Rosendorff (2010) studies how variation in the strength of international courts affects 
dispute settlements in a model which, like ours, incorporates complainants’ demands and defendants’ (potential) 
concessions. Their model can be applied to international trade institutions, but while we focus on weak institutions, 
their interest is in the pros and the cons of strengthening such institutions. 
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A. The Economic Environment
We consider a model with two large countries, Home and Foreign, trading between 
each other, which has been used in several previous analyses of trade  negotiations.6 
Each economy is characterized by three sectors,  i = 0, 1, 2 . All goods are  produced 
using a constant-returns-to-scale technology under perfect competition. Good  0 
is freely traded and serves as the numeraire; it is produced using labor alone. We 
choose units so that its international and domestic prices are both equal to one, 
and the aggregate labor supply,  L =  L –, is assumed to be large enough to sustain 
 production of a positive amount of good  0 . As a result, in a competitive equilibrium 
the wage rate equals unity in each country. Goods  1 and  2 are produced instead 
using labor and a sector-specific input, which is available in fixed supply. Home is 
 abundant in sector-specific input  2 , whereas Foreign is abundant in  sector-specific 
input  1 . Consequently, Home imports good  1 , while Foreign imports good  2 . To 
simplify the analysis, we assume symmetry in factor endowments between the two 
countries. The domestic and international prices of a non-numeraire good  i are 
denoted by  p i and  π i , respectively. The rent  R i , accruing to the specific factor used 
in sector  i , depends only on the good’s producer price, and can thus be expressed as 
R i (  p i ) . Industry supply is given by  Q i (  p i ) = ∂ R i /∂ p i .
Trade policies in the two countries take the form of ad valorem import tariffs 
or subsidies, denoted by  τ and  τ ⁎ , and drive a wedge between domestic and inter-
national prices.7 Focusing on the Home country, the domestic price of good  1 is 
thus equal to  p 1 = (1 + τ)  π 1 , with  τ > 0 ( τ < 0 ) representing an import tariff ( subsidy); the domestic price of the export good is instead equal to  p 2 =  π 2 . In 
Foreign, domestic prices are given by  p 1 
⁎ =  π 1 and  p 2 ⁎ = (1 +  τ ⁎ )  π 2 .
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents, and we set the population’s 
size equal to one. Each agent shares the same quasi-linear and additively separable 
preferences, which can be written as
(1)  u( c 0 ,  c 1 ,  c 2 ) ≡  c 0 +  ∑ 
i=1
2
  u i ( c i ), 
where  c 0 is the consumption of the numeraire good, and  c i ,  i = 1, 2 represent 
instead the consumption of the other goods. The sub-utility functions are assumed 
to be twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.
Provided that income always exceeds the expenditure on the numeraire 
good, the  domestic demand for good  i ∈ {1, 2} can be expressed as a 
 function  of  price  alone,  D i (  p i ) . Imports of good  1 by Home can then be 
expressed  as  M 1 (  p 1 ) =  D 1 ( p 1 ) −  Q 1 (  p 1 ) , while exports are instead given by 
 X 2 (  p 2 ) =  Q 2 (  p 2 ) −  D 2 (  p 2 ) .
6 See, for instance, Mayer (1981) and Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi (2012). 
7 This allows us to describe the preferences of the two countries in the tariff space ( τ,  τ ⁎ ) and to easily char-
acterize trade negotiations between them. As argued by Levy (1999), export subsidies and taxes are rarely used. 
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The international markets for goods  1 and  2 are in equilibrium when
(2)  M 1 ((1 + τ)  π 1 ) −  X 1 ⁎ ( π 1 ) = 0,  
(3)  M 2 ⁎ ((1 +  τ ⁎ )  π 2 ) −  X 2 ( π 2 ) = 0. 
From (2) and (3), we can derive an expression for international equilibrium 
prices as a function of the trade policies implemented in the two countries, i.e., 
 π 1 (τ) ,  π 2 ( τ ⁎ ) . Tariff revenues in Home are given by
(4)  T(τ) = τ  π 1 (τ)  M 1 (τ) 
and are assumed to be redistributed uniformly among all domestic residents.
In this model, individuals derive income from several different sources: they 
all supply one unit of labor and earn wages; they also receive the same lump sum 
 transfer (possibly negative) of trade policy revenues from the government and they 
own some share of the specific inputs used in the production of goods  1 and  2 . We 
assume that the Home government seeks to maximize a social welfare function, 
which is defined as a weighted sum of all citizens’ income (total labor income, 
industry rents, and government revenues), plus consumer surplus, i.e.:
(5)  W(τ,  τ ⁎ ) = 1 + α  R 1 (τ ) +  R 2 ( τ ⁎ ) + T(τ ) + Ω(τ ) + Ω( τ ⁎ ),  
where  Ω(τ ) ≡ u( D 1 (τ )) −  p 1 D 1 (τ ) and  Ω( τ ⁎ ) ≡ u( D 2 ( τ ⁎ )) −  p 2 D 2 ( τ ⁎ ) , i.e., the 
first term describes the surplus from the consumption of good 1 and the second from 
the consumption of good 2. We assume that  α > 1 to capture a protectionist bias in 
the setting of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman 2005).8 To simplify notation, we 
do not include  α as an argument of the welfare function, as it will remain constant 
throughout the analysis.
The preferences of the Foreign government are given by
(6)  W ∗ (τ,  τ ⁎ , γ ) = 1 +  R 1 ⁎ (τ ) + γ  R 2 ⁎ ( τ ⁎ ) +  T ⁎ ( τ ⁎ ) + Ω( τ ⁎ ) + Ω(τ ),  
where  γ captures the Foreign protectionist bias, and its initial value is given by 
γ 0 > 1 . In the remainder of the paper,  γ will be referred to as the Foreign 
 government’s type.9
As is standard in this class of models (e.g., Rosendorff 2005), we make the 
 following natural assumptions about both governments’ objective functions. First, 
for any given level of Home tariff  τ [resp. of Foreign tariff  τ ⁎ and type  γ ],  W (τ, ⋅ ) 
[resp.  W ⁎ ( ⋅ ,  τ ⁎ , γ ) ] strictly decreases with  τ ⁎ [resp. with  τ ]. This simply ensures 
that, in each country, the losses incurred by domestic export firms when the other 
country raises its tariff always outweigh the benefits to domestic consumers. 
8 For instance, this could be due to the fact that the import-competing industry is politically organized and 
 lobbies the government in a model à la Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
9 See Bagwell and Staiger (2005) for a similar setting. 
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Second, for any given level of  τ ⁎ [resp. of  τ and  γ ],  W ( ⋅ ,  τ ⁎ ) [resp.  W ⁎ (τ, ⋅ , γ ) ] 
first increases and then decreases with  τ [resp. with  τ ⁎ ]. This ensures that  W ( ⋅ ,  τ ⁎ ) 
and  W ⁎ (τ, ⋅ , γ ) have unique maximizers, which we denote by  τ ̃ and  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ ) 
 respectively. (Additive separability in (5) and (6) implies that  τ ̃ is independent of 
τ ⁎ , and that  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ ) is independent of  τ .)
Tariffs  τ ̃ and  τ ̃ ∗ (γ ) are clearly those which would be implemented if gov-
ernments chose their policies non-cooperatively—or, using the language of the 
 previous  literature, if they engaged in a “trade war.” Figure 1 provides an illustra-
tion for governments’ preferences:  W (resp.  W ⁎ ) describes an indifference curve for 
the Home (resp. Foreign) government. A downward (resp. leftward) shift leads to 
higher values of the government’s objective function. The policy pair  ( τ ̃,  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ )) lies 
at the intersection between the two curves and describes the coordinates of point 
N . Clearly the two governments could make themselves better off if they could 
agree on any tariff pair lying within the lens described by the two  indifference 
curves. In particular, the portion  AB of the contract curve  CC identifies the set of 
Pareto  optimal tariff pairs that improve upon the Nash equilibrium  N . Note that, as 
long as  α and  γ 0 are sufficiently large,  AB belong to the positive orthant, and we 
will assume this to be the case. We further assume that the initial trade agreement 
between the two governments,  ( τ a ,  τ a ⁎ ) , belongs to  AB .
B. A Simple Model of Trade Coercion
Our goal is to investigate whether and how different institutional arrangements 
affect the outcome of trade coercion. To do so, we develop a model with two active 
Figure 1. Policy Preferences When  γ =  γ 0 
E
A
B
CC
 τ  ⁎
  τ ̃⁎( γ 0 )
 τ a ⁎
 W ⁎ ( γ 0 
  
) 
 τ τ a   τ ̃0
W
N
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agents, the Home and the Foreign governments, which possibly interact with an 
IO. In the preliminary stage, the Foreign government privately observes the new 
value of its protectionist bias  γ , which is drawn from a cumulative distribution 
function  F 0 . We assume that  F 0 has a continuous and strictly positive density over 
some interval  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] . Note that for (and only for) expositional clarity, we assume 
that there is no asymmetry of information about the Home government’s protec-
tionist bias,  α .10
In order to justify the use of coercion by the Foreign government in the next stages 
of the model, we need to make two assumptions. First, we assume that  τ ̃ ⁎ ( γ _ ) >  τ a ⁎. 
This ensures that the Foreign government is always prepared to raise its tariff 
above the initial agreement  τ a ⁎ if the Home government does not acquiesce to its 
demands for lower Home tariffs. In addition, to accommodate cases of multilateral 
coercion (i.e., within the framework of the IO), the Foreign government’s coercive 
actions must be justified by a violation of the original agreement,  ( τ a ,  τ a ⁎ ) . To this 
end, we further assume that a shock has also occurred in the Home country, which 
causes its government to seek an adjustment to its trade policy away from the 
original agreed level,  τ a . Several motives can be invoked for this desired change. 
For example, it could be the result of the election of a new government in Home, 
which prefers less trade than its predecessor (as in Bown 2002). Alternatively, it 
could be driven by a real or simply perceived import “surge,” etc.11 We assume 
that, as a consequence of this shock, the Home government has increased its tar-
iff on imports to some  τ 0 >  τ a . Note that this increase may not necessarily be 
in definite violation of the existing agreement between the two countries: as in 
Maggi and Staiger (2011), one can think of the agreement as an incomplete con-
tract containing “gray areas” about the circumstances in which exceptions should 
be granted. As a result, the Home government might well deem its choice of tariff 
as perfectly legal. At the same time, however, the Foreign government is dissatis-
fied with Home’s policy change and has decided to use coercion to reduce Home’s 
tariff, i.e., it threatens to increase  τ a ⁎ if Home does not implement a new trade 
policy  τ <  τ 0 .12 More generally, since our focus in this paper is on the strate-
gic aspects that underlie trade disputes themselves, irrespective of the events that 
prompted them, we will follow Rosendorff (2005) and treat the status quo policies 
( τ 0 ,  τ 0 ⁎ ) = ( τ 0 ,  τ a ⁎ ) as given.
10 This assumption is totally innocuous. Indeed, additive separability of the governments’ preferences ensures 
that the Foreign trade-war tariff does not depend on Home’s preferences and, therefore, that the Home gov-
ernment’s actions would not imply any relevant belief updating about  α . Thus, including uncertainty about  α 
would add  nothing but notation: when making demands, the Foreign government would anticipate the expected 
(as opposed to the known) response from the Home government. Moreover, our results remain intact if we assume 
that the Foreign government’s set of types is a finite set. 
11 See, for example, the debate around the 30 percent US steel tariff introduced by the Bush administration in 
2002 (see, e.g., Rosendorff 2005). 
12 Note that since we are interested in developing a model of coercion as opposed to bargaining, we do not 
allow the Foreign government to use its tariff as a bargaining instrument when it formulates its demand. In 
other words, in this model, as in Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger (2007), the import-competing sector is only a 
“ retaliation-good sector” in the sense that the Foreign government can only use its tariff  τ ⁎ as a retaliation  instrument 
when coercion is unsuccessful. 
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The sequence of events that follow the realization of  γ depends on Foreign’s 
 institutional arrangements for trade coercion:
 (i)  Absence of IO Membership.—Suppose first that Foreign is not a mem-
ber of the IO, so that coercion must be unilateral. In this case, the Foreign 
government threatens to increase its tariff unless the Home government 
 acquiesces to a demand  τ ≤  τ 0 . If the Home government concedes,  reducing 
its tariff from  τ 0 to  τ , then Foreign does not impose any sanction. Then the 
 policy vector  (τ,  τ 0 ⁎ ) is implemented. If the Home government stands firm, 
then the Foreign government carries out its threat, thereby triggering a 
trade war.
 (ii) Full Commitment to the IO.—Suppose now that Foreign is a member of 
the IO and is fully committed to its dispute settlement process—so that 
 coercion  must be conducted multilaterally. The process through which 
 disputes are  settled in international trade organizations is usually long and 
 complex. It  typically involves consultations between the sender and target 
(and  potentially third parties and/or mediators) to reconcile their differences 
by themselves, IO panels’ hearings and parties’ rebuttals, several reports 
from the IO panel to the parties and, in the absence of an early settlement, 
rulings and appeals. Our aim here is to focus on the effects of incomplete 
 information on  multilateral negotiation outcomes and, therefore, to abstract 
away from any other  complexity that such a situation might entail. To this end, 
and to ease comparison with the previous framework, we model  proceedings 
as follows.
  First, both parties observe the realization of the IO panel’s “interpretation” 
of the trade agreement,  τ  io  . The Foreign government then makes a demand 
τ ≤  τ 0 . The Home government can concede to this demand (ending the 
game with the implementation of the policy pair  (τ,  τ 0 ⁎ ) ) or reject it. In the lat-
ter case, the IO issues ruling  τ  io . The Home government reacts to the ruling 
in one of two ways: compliance (ending the game with the implementation of 
policy pair  ( τ io ,  τ 0 ⁎ ) ) or noncompliance. If it fails to comply with the ruling, 
then the IO authorizes Foreign to retaliate and a trade war ensues.
  Although this is a highly abstract version of GATT-WTO proceedings, it 
contains all the elements needed to study the impact of incomplete informa-
tion and IO membership on trade coercion, which is the main focus of the 
present paper.
 (iii) Partial Commitment to the IO. —As explained in the introduction, it is 
 interesting to consider also an intermediate case in which the Foreign gov-
ernment initially decides whether to coerce unilaterally or multilaterally. 
The remainder of the game is as in (i) if it chooses to coerce unilaterally, 
and as in (ii) otherwise. This setting captures, for instance, the working of 
the Section 301 provision of the 1974 US Trade Act, under which action on 
a dispute could be unilateral or accompanied by a GATT-WTO complaint 
(e.g., Busch and Reinhardt 2000, Pelc 2010).
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Before we proceed with the analysis, we need to discuss three of the  assumptions 
of the model. First, we treat the IO ruling  τ io as exogenous. Note that our main 
goal is to study how countries’ commitment to international dispute settlement 
 mechanisms affect trade coercion outcomes. Consequently, in our model, the 
IO  dispute  settlement process is taken as given. The value of  τ io can simply be 
 interpreted as the  governments’ (common) expectations about the ideal ruling 
of the decisive IO-panel member. More specifically, one can think of the IO as 
an  organization with its own social welfare function (maximized by  τ io ), which 
is unaffected by the political pressure from domestic actors.13 Beyond intrinsic 
 policy preferences  concerning the current situation, this objective function may 
also be influenced by other  external factors—e.g., consistency with previous 
 rulings and setting  precedents in  anticipation of potential future disputes. A second 
assumption of the model is that, once the Foreign government has filed a complaint 
with the IO, it always complies with the IO ruling and empirical evidence supports 
this view. In fact, as observed by Pelc (2010), “… once the United States began 
GATT  proceedings, it did not turn back to unilateralism.” In particular, the United 
States never retaliated unilaterally nor threatened to do so after a panel decision 
was reached. Finally, we assume that, even in the case of full commitment to the 
IO,  noncompliance to a ruling leads to a trade war. This evidently does not mean 
that the IO falls apart whenever a defendant spurns its ruling. In reality, the WTO 
only authorizes the complainant to retaliate on a noncomplying defendant within 
certain limits.14 However, even such  constrained retaliatory trade sanctions might 
cause the target to retaliate in turn, leading to  escalation into further sanctions. 
We thus assume—for simplicity—that a trade war follows noncompliance. It is 
important to note though that all of our qualitative results carry over to alterna-
tive settings with constrained retaliation. In fact,  consider the case in which the 
IO imposes a limit, say  Δ , on the increase in the Foreign  tariff, to capture the 
idea contained in World Trade Organization (2002) art. 22.4 that “… the level of 
the suspension of the concessions or other  obligations authorized by the Dispute 
Settlement Body shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impair-
ment.” In this case, unsuccessful  multilateral  coercion would lead to a “constrained 
trade war,” in which the type- γ Foreign government would implement a tariff of 
 ς ̃⁎ (γ ) ≡ min {  τ ̃⁎ (γ ),  τ 0 ⁎ + Δ} (instead of  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ ) ). Nothing in the logic of the 
13 The growing judicialization of the WTO has led to the introduction of an Appellate Body, made up of 
 independent legal experts, selected to deal with all the disputes that will arise in their four-year terms. Several 
observers have argued (e.g., Zangl 2008) that its rulings are less likely to be biased in favor of one of the parties 
involved than under the preexisting GATT arrangements. 
14 A well-known case in which the complainant accepted the WTO ruling, whereas the defendant did not, is the 
Beef-Hormone dispute between Canada and the United States on the one hand and the EU on the other. In 1989, 
the EU banned the importation of meat containing six artificial growth hormones approved instead for use in the 
United States. Under WTO rules, this type of ban is allowed, but only if the part introducing the ban is able to pro-
vide valid scientific evidence that the measure had been introduced because of a health and safety concern. In 1997, 
the Dispute Settlement Body ruled against the EU, and the ruling was confirmed by the Appellate Body in 1998. 
As the EU did not initially comply, an arbitrator appointed by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body authorized the 
United States and Canada to impose, respectively, a tariff of US$116.8 and US$8 million per year on the EU (Kerr 
and Hobbs 2002). The controversy on the matter is still ongoing. In September 2009, the EU and the United States 
signed a  memorandum of understanding, which established a new duty-free quota for grain-fed, high-quality beef 
as a compromise. As of December 2016 though, based on continued concerns on US beef access to the EU market, 
the United States has taken steps to reinstate retaliatory tariffs. 
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 arguments we will develop in Section III would be affected, since all the key incen-
tives would be preserved: the Home government would still be better off facing 
low rather than high Foreign government types, and trade wars would still be more 
damaging to low than to high types. We return to this in more detail when we pro-
vide intuitions for our results (see footnotes 17 and 20). As we will see, what mat-
ters for the IO to have an impact on coercion outcomes is that it allows the Home 
government to secure the tariff  τ io when it believes that the Foreign  government’s 
type is high.
Each variant of the model describes a sequential game of incomplete infor-
mation. We solve it by looking for (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibria, 
which are defined as follows: (i) the Home government’s beliefs are generated by 
Bayesian updating whenever possible, and (ii) in each stage, governments’ actions 
are optimal, given their beliefs and their opponents’ strategies. In order to elimi-
nate  equilibria, which rely on implausible beliefs off the equilibrium path, we use 
criterion D1 from Cho and Kreps (1987). Intuitively, this refinement requires that 
if the set of Home government’s actions that make some foreign government’s type 
γ willing to  deviate is strictly smaller than the set of actions that make some other 
type  γ ′ willing to  deviate, then the Home government should believe that type  γ ′ 
is infinitely more likely to deviate than  γ is.15 In the remainder of the paper, any 
reference to an “ equilibrium” is to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consistent with 
criterion D1.16
II. International Trade Institutions and Coercion Outcomes
In this section, we characterize in turn the equilibria that will emerge from the 
three institutional settings described in the previous section.
A. Benchmark: Coercive Trade Policy in the Absence of the IO
Both because it is empirically relevant and because it provides a benchmark to 
compare outcomes with those possible when the Foreign government can coerce 
multilaterally, we start by analyzing the case in which the Foreign country is not a 
member of the IO.
Trade Wars and Reservation Demands.—To solve the game, we begin with 
the last stage in which the two governments engage in a trade war. Although this 
 continuation game may involve the presence of asymmetric information, it always 
has a unique equilibrium outcome: the Home government adopts its ideal tariff  τ ̃, 
irrespective of the Foreign government’s policy choice; likewise, the type- γ Foreign 
government adopts its ideal tariff  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ) , irrespective of the Home government’s 
 policy choice.
15 This is a strengthening of the Intuitive Criterion, which has no bite in this game. See the supplementary online 
Appendix for the formal definition. 
16 In order to limit the number of possible cases (without affecting the paper’s conclusions), we also assume that 
in case of a tie, a player will prefer to agree than to disagree with the other player or the IO. 
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Given the outcome of a trade war, consider now the Home government’s  decision 
of whether to concede to the Foreign government’s demand  τ . Suppose that its 
beliefs about  γ are given by some cdf  F . It will concede to demand  τ if and only if 
its payoff from conceding exceeds its expected payoff from triggering a trade war; 
that is
(7)  W(τ,  τ 0 ⁎) ≥  ∫  γ _   γ – W (  τ ̃,  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ )) dF(γ ) . 
Let the smallest value of  τ that satisfies the above inequality be denoted by  T (F ) . 
This is the Home government’s “reservation demand,” or the minimum demand it 
will accept rather than engage in a trade war. In what follows, we will sometimes 
indulge in a slight abuse of notation and denote by  T (γ  ) the Home government’s 
reservation tariff when its beliefs assign probability 1 to type  γ . Similarly, the type- γ 
Foreign government’s reservation demand  T ⁎ (γ ) —that is, the Home tariff at which 
the Foreign government is indifferent between settling and engaging in a trade 
war—is defined as the largest value of tariff  τ that satisfies
(8)  W ⁎ (τ,  τ 0 ⁎, γ ) ≥  W ⁎ (  τ ̃,  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ ), γ ) 
(recall that  W ⁎ (τ,  τ 0 ⁎, γ ) decreases as  τ increases).
It can be easily shown that  T(γ ) and  T  ⁎ (γ ) are both strictly decreasing in  γ . An 
increase in  γ causes the trade-war tariff of the Foreign government,  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ ) , to rise. 
As  W(  τ ̃,  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ )) decreases with  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ ) (and therefore with  γ ), the Home government 
is willing to implement a lower tariff to avoid a trade war. In contrast, applying the 
Envelope Theorem reveals that  W ⁎ (  τ ̃,  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ ), γ ) increases with  γ , so that greater 
political pressure from its import-competing sector makes the Foreign government 
less willing to tolerate high tariffs applied by Home.17 We assume throughout our 
analysis that  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) . Intuitively, this means that, facing the “weakest” 
type of Foreign government, the Home country is only willing to make small com-
promises that are not even acceptable to that type of Foreign government: the lat-
ter’s level of resolve is too high for it to tolerate Home tariffs above  T ( γ _ ) but is 
at the same time too low for the Home government to concede to demands below 
 T ⁎ ( γ _ ) .18 As explained in Section IV, this assumption is made purely for technical 
convenience as it allows us to avoid equilibrium existence issues that arise if 
 T ⁎ ( γ _ ) > T( γ _ ) .
The Ineffectiveness of Unilateral Coercion. —Can the Foreign government obtain 
a concession from the Home government in equilibrium? This question is answered 
in the following.
17 It is readily checked that these key properties of  T (γ ) and  T  ⁎ (γ ) would still hold if the IO imposed a cap 
τ 0 ⁎ + Δ on the Foreign government’s retaliatory tariff, which would then be equal to  ς ̃∗ (γ ) ≡ min {  τ ̃ ⁎ (γ ),  τ 0 ⁎ + Δ} 
for each type  γ . As  ς ̃⁎ (γ ) may be constant on some interval of types, the resulting reservation-tariff function for the 
Home government,   (γ ) , would only be weakly decreasing. However, as  W ⁎ ( τ ̃,  ς ̃⁎ (γ ), γ ) is strictly increasing in  γ , 
the Foreign reservation tariff, now denoted by    ⁎ (γ) , would remain strictly decreasing. 
18 Note that we only need this condition to hold when  γ =  γ _ , which is a measure-zero event. 
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PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that there is no IO—so that coercion must be unilateral. 
There exists an equilibrium, and in any equilibrium, the Foreign government always 
fails to obtain a concession from the Home government.
PROOF: 
See Appendix A. ∎
To understand the intuition for this result, note that upon observing the demand 
τ by the Foreign government, the Home government—uninformed about the 
level of political pressure  γ that has emerged in the Foreign country—updates its 
beliefs. Given these new beliefs, say  F , it concedes to  τ if and only if  τ ≥ T (F ) . 
As its  reservation demand  T (γ ) is decreasing in  γ , the best strategy for the Foreign 
 government is to signal high values of  γ by requiring a low level of  τ . Indeed, trade 
wars are less costly to Foreign governments that are very sensitive to the  well-being 
of the import sector (characterized by a high- γ )— the Foreign reservation demand 
T  ⁎ (γ ) decreases with  γ —and the Foreign government is therefore more likely 
to risk a trade war when  γ is large. Understanding this, the Home government 
 rationally infers higher values of  γ from a demand for a lower tariff. Such beliefs 
lead the  foreign policymaker to go too far, however, and to make requests which the 
Home government is not prepared to meet. This signaling spiral leads all types of 
Foreign government to make unsuccessful demands, and a trade war will ensue in 
every equilibrium.
More specifically, it is straightforward to see that there is always a separating 
 equilibrium in which no concession can be obtained. In such an equilibrium, all types 
of Foreign government make different unacceptable demands (i.e., demands below 
T ( γ _ ) ) and the Home government believes that any deviation is the action of the 
weakest type  γ _ . This implies that the Home government would only be prepared to 
concede to demands  τ > T ( γ _ ) . As the Foreign reservation demand  T  ⁎ (γ ) decreases 
with  γ (so that  T  ∗ (γ )  ≤  T  ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) ), deviating to such demands is not profit-
able for any type of Foreign government. In addition, an equilibrium in which con-
cessions may arise would have to be pooling—otherwise, the Foreign types that do 
not obtain concessions or only modest concessions would mimic the type(s) which 
obtain the best concession. What remains to establish, therefore, is that concessions 
in a pooling equilibrium are impossible. Assume toward a contradiction that a subset 
of types, say  [  γ _ 0 ,  γ –0 ] ⊆  [  γ _ ,  γ –] , obtain a concession  τ from the Home government 
in some equilibrium.19 This implies that  T  ⁎ ( γ –0 ) > τ ≥ T(F′ ) > T (  γ –0 ) , where 
F′ represents the updated beliefs of the Home government conditional on observing 
demand  τ . (The last inequality follows from the fact that the Home government is 
prepared to make more concessions if it believes with certainty that Foreign’s type 
is  γ –0 than if it believes that any type in  [  γ _ 0 ,  γ –0 ] is possible.) Now consider a devia-
tion from a request  τ to a smaller tariff  τ ′ , running the risk to trigger a trade war. As 
19 The assumption that this subset is an interval is only made for expositional convenience. The proof of the 
proposition considers all possible subsets of  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] . 
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higher types have stronger incentives to run such a risk, it turns out that reasonable 
beliefs eliminate all types smaller than  γ –0 . Being convinced that it faces a more 
resolved Foreign government, the Home government is thus better off conceding to 
the new demand  τ ′ if it is sufficiently close to  τ . This in turn makes the deviation to 
τ ′ < τ profitable for the type- γ –0 Foreign government: a contradiction.
B. Coercive Trade Policy with Full Commitment to the IO
We now turn to the analysis of the consequences of full commitment to the IO 
on trade coercion outcomes. One of the questions this paper seeks to answer is 
how international trade institutions, despite their lack of enforcement power, can be 
effective in settling disputes. We have just shown how the logic of unilateral trade 
coercion locks the Foreign government into signaling spirals leading to trade wars. 
Despite being unable to enforce its rulings, can the IO’s dispute settlement process 
do a better job of obtaining concessions from the Home government?
The answer is positive, and the intuition is that full commitment to the IO’s 
 dispute settlement process may offer the Foreign government an opportunity to 
break the spiral of unilateral coercion. To see how this can occur in equilibrium, 
suppose that  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) . Consider first the stage in which the Home government 
must decide whether or not to comply with the IO ruling  τ io . Failure to comply 
would trigger a trade war. Therefore, it follows from the analysis of the trade-
war stage we have developed in the previous section that it chooses to comply if 
and only if  τ io ≥ T(F ) , where the cdf  F stands for the updated beliefs about the 
Foreign government’s type  γ at this stage. This implies that, when confronted with 
some demand  τ from the Foreign government, the Home government’s optimal 
strategy is to concede if and only if  τ ≥ max{ τ io , T (F )} . As long as  T(F ) >  τ io , 
the same signaling incentives as under unilateral coercion drive the Foreign govern-
ment to deviate from successful demands by asking for lower tariffs, which signal 
high values of  γ and reduce the Home government’s reservation tariff  T(F ) . When 
T(F )  ≤  τ io , however, the Home government’s reservation demand becomes equal 
to  τ io and cannot be reduced any further. Believing that the Foreign government’s 
type is high, the Home government can secure the tariff  τ io instead of risking a 
costly trade war. Thus, the presence of the IO mitigates the connection between the 
Foreign government’s type and the trade-war payoffs. In particular, if all types of 
Foreign government demand  τ io , then the Home government’s beliefs (correctly 
derived from Bayes’ rule) must be given by  F 0 . As  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) , the Home gov-
ernment concedes to this demand and a trade war is avoided. Since  W ⁎ (τ,  τ 0 ⁎, γ ) 
strictly decreases with  τ for all  γ , it follows that no type of Foreign government can 
profitably deviate: the Home government would always be better off implementing 
the tariff  τ io than conceding to lower demands. We conclude that a trade war can be 
avoided if  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) .20
20 Note that the logic of this argument would remain unaltered if  T (γ ) and  T ⁎ (γ ) were replaced by the 
 reservation-tariff functions   (γ ) and    ⁎ (γ ) , defined in footnote 17 for the case where the Foreign government’s 
retaliatory tariff is constrained by the IO. In particular, as    ⁎ (γ ) is a strictly decreasing function— i.e., trade wars 
are less damaging to the Foreign government as its type increases— signaling incentives and the IO ruling would 
play the same role as described above. 
240 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS AUGUST 2019
Our next result shows that the condition  τ io ≥ T( F 0 ) is also necessary for a 
trade war to be avoided. If  τ io is too low then, as in the case of unilateral coercion, 
the Foreign government’s demands spiral down to unacceptable levels leading to a 
trade war.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the Foreign government is fully committed to the IO— so 
that coercion must be multilateral. There always exists an equilibrium, and the 
 following is true in any equilibrium:
 (i ) If  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) , then: either all types of Foreign government obtain the 
concession  τ io , or they all make unsuccessful demands following which the 
Home government complies with the IO ruling.
 (ii ) If  τ io < T ( F 0 ) , then all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful 
demands following which the Home government fails to comply with the IO 
ruling.
PROOF: 
See Appendix B. ∎
Combined with Proposition 1, Proposition 2 shows that an IO can affect the 
 outcome of trade coercion and prevent trade wars, even though it has no enforce-
ment power. It also suggests a possible explanation for why trade coercion appears 
to be more effective in obtaining concessions from target governments when con-
ducted multilaterally. We will elaborate on the empirical and normative implications 
of the equilibrium analysis in Section III.
C. Coercive Trade Policy with Partial Commitment to the IO
Under partial commitment to the IO, the Foreign government is allowed to 
choose whether to coerce the Home government unilaterally or  multilaterally. 
Suppose that  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) , and that the Foreign government’s type  γ  satisfies 
 T(γ ) <  τ io <  T ⁎ (γ ) , so that both countries are better off implementing  τ io than 
engaging in a trade war. Our analysis so far reveals that the signaling  incentives 
inherent in unilateral coercion would lead the Foreign government to make 
 inefficient demands to the Home government. To avoid this outcome, the type- γ 
Foreign  government would therefore be expected to adopt multilateral  coercion. 
Some authors argue, however, that taking a trade dispute to an IO signals a lack 
of resolve—i.e., a low  γ —by the sender government (e.g., Reinhardt 2000, 
Pelc 2010). The next proposition provides a formalization of their argument.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose the Foreign government is only partially committed to 
the IO—so that it can choose between unilateral and multilateral coercion. There 
exists an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government coerce unilaterally 
and fail to obtain a concession. In addition, a trade war arises with probability one 
in any equilibrium.
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PROOF: 
See Appendix C. ∎
In other words, partial commitment to the IO yields the same outcome as absence 
of membership: in both cases, the Foreign government fails to obtain a concession 
from the Home government, and a trade war ensues.
Note though that the Foreign government’s coercive policy has now two 
 components: the demand  τ and the method of coercion (unilateral versus 
 multilateral) through which this demand is made. A deviation from multilateral to 
unilateral  coercion in this case conveys the same signal as a deviation to a lower 
tariff demand in the absence of an IO: the Home government therefore anticipates 
tougher  retaliatory measures in case of a trade war. As in the unilateral-coercion 
game, such beliefs induce the Home government to concede to lower unilateral 
demands. This in turn drives the Foreign government to (unilaterally) ask for even 
lower tariffs until its demands become unacceptable.
These incentives to coerce unilaterally to signal high resolve can only disappear 
when in equilibrium all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful demands 
(either unilaterally or multilaterally), thus leading to a trade war. In this case, the 
Home government interprets any deviation by its foreign counterpart as an attempt 
to escape this outcome and, consequently, infers that the Foreign government’s type 
γ must be low. It is therefore optimal for the Home government to only accept 
demands so high that the Foreign government prefers to engage in a trade war.
III. Implications
Our theoretical model provides novel insights on the influence of international 
trade institutions on coercion outcomes. Importantly, our results are consistent with 
the stylized facts that have been uncovered in the existing empirical literature. In 
this section, we briefly review these empirical findings and explain how they relate 
to our analysis.
Unilateral versus Multilateral Coercion: The Influence of International Trade 
Institutions.—Busch and Reinhardt (2000) observes that, during the GATT period, 
only two-fifths of the rulings in favor of the complainant resulted in full  compliance 
by the defendant—whereas in nearly a third of the cases, defendants failed to  comply 
at all. Even though the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement  mechanism 
improved the situation, as Rossmiller (1994) pointed out, the WTO remains a 
“court with no bailiff.” These observations prompt the following question: can a 
 multilateral institution influence coercion outcomes despite its lack of enforcement 
power? Empirical evidence uncovered by Pelc (2010) suggests that this is indeed the 
case. Focusing on the US experience between 1975 and 2000, he finds that disputes 
that went through the GATT, rather than relying only on Section 301, are 34 percent-
age points more likely to result in a concession.
Pelc (2010) suggests that it is the perceived illegitimacy of  unilateral  coercion 
and the importance of reputation which decrease the likelihood of a  target conced-
ing. While resistance to institutionally constrained demands entails the  reputational 
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cost of being branded a violator, resistance to unilateral threats— regarded as ille-
gitimate by the rest of the world—yields a reputational benefit: it decreases the 
likelihood of being unilaterally targeted again in the future. Our formal analysis 
provides an alternative rationale, which focuses on the role played by the sender 
government’s incentives. On the one hand,  unilateral  coercion creates signaling 
spirals leading the sender government to make  unacceptable demands. On the 
other, commitment to a multilateral organization can break these spirals and allow 
the sender government to obtain concessions.
Early Dispute Settlements.—Analyzing evidence on more than 600 GATT-WTO 
disputes from 1948 through 1999, Busch and Reinhardt (2000) observes that in a 
majority of cases (about 55 percent), no panel was ever established, and a further 
8 percent of them ended prior to the issuance of a panel report. Paraphrasing them, a 
key question is why should target governments settle early given that they can spurn 
adverse rulings with impunity. They argue that the source of early concessions lies 
in the normative power of GATT-WTO rulings and in the pressure to abide by the 
norm: an adverse ruling may weaken the target government’s political position in its 
own country, as well as its position in ongoing multilateral trade talks. As a result, if 
the target government is uncertain about the IO ruling, then it may prefer to concede 
beforehand.
Consistently with the evidence, Proposition 2 (i) shows that pre-ruling settle-
ments may occur in equilibrium.21 Importantly though, in our setting, the mech-
anism at work is different: IO rulings do not convey any normative or reputational 
costs. When the Foreign government anticipates a “high tariff” IO ruling (i.e., when 
τ io ≥ T( F 0 ) ), it expects the Home government to comply with this ruling. This 
leads the Foreign government to abandon aggressive strategies and to make more 
accommodating demands to which the Home government is willing to concede.22 
Thus, it is mainly the sender government’s (rather than target’s) incentives which 
are affected by the prospect of the IO decision.
An Alternative Rationale for International Trade Agreements.—Our model 
 suggests a possible explanation for another empirical puzzle: given that member-
ship in an international trade organization may limit the (coercive) policy discretion 
of a national government, why would the latter choose to join a supranational body? 
Most of the existing literature on this topic suggests that states become members 
of such institutions to solve the coordination problem created by the terms of trade 
externality from tariffs (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Our analysis reveals, how-
ever, that another driving force may emanate from informational asymmetries in 
trade coercion. By helping to explain why demands channeled through the multilat-
eral system may be more successful than unilateral demands, our model provides a 
new rationale for states’ commitment to multilateral institutions.
21 The proof of Proposition 2 (Section B in the Appendix) shows that something even stronger is true if 
 τ io >  T  ⁎ ( γ – ) : in all equilibria, the Foreign government obtains an early concession from the Home government. 
22 In fact, Busch and Reinhardt (2000) points out that among those disputes ending prior to a ruling, 67 percent 
exhibit full or partial concession by the target government. 
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To see this, suppose that we add an initial stage to the game in which the Foreign 
government decides whether or not to fully commit to the IO. If  τ io < T( F 0 ) , then 
it is indifferent between all institutional arrangements: a trade war is  inevitable. 
Suppose instead that  T ( F 0 ) ≤  τ io ≤  T ⁎ (γ ) . An immediate corollary of 
Propositions 1–3 is that, in this case, the Foreign government is better off fully 
 committing to the IO.
The Role of Commitment to International Organizations.—Proposition 3 shows 
that institutions allowing sender governments to choose between unilateralism and 
multilateralism can reduce the effectiveness of coercion. A leading  historical  example 
of the coexistence of these two coercion methods is represented by Section  301 
of the US Trade Act of 1974. This provision allowed the United States to take a 
 number of unilateral retaliatory actions against any foreign measures deemed to 
violate existing agreements or otherwise impeding its interests. At the same time, 
the United States retained access to the dispute settlement system provided by the 
GATT-WTO (Pelc 2010).
As argued by Pelc (2010), the availability of unilateral coercion did not deliver 
the expected results, and in fact, the United States “ultimately found it in its 
 interest to … push for greater formal constraints in the Uruguay Round that ulti-
mately raised the costs of unilateralism further.” In our model, if we allowed the 
Foreign government to choose between full and partial commitment to the IO, then 
it would strictly prefer the former whenever  T ( F 0 ) ≤  τ io <  T ⁎ (γ ) . The Foreign 
government would indeed be better off making a successful demand  τ io under full 
commitment (Proposition 2) than making an unsuccessful demand under partial 
commitment (Proposition 3). Unlike Pelc’s explanation based on the illegitimacy of 
unilateral coercion, our result though stems from the Foreign government’s strategic 
incentives created by the presence of a unilateral option. Even though the Foreign 
government would be better off if this option were not available, incentives to signal 
higher levels of resolve to the Home government by deviating from multilateral to 
unilateral coercion eventually lead the Foreign government to make unacceptable 
demands (Subsection 3.3). These incentives are reminiscent of Reinhardt’s (2000) 
observation that taking a dispute to the GATT was a signal of the complainant’s lack 
of resolve.
IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Summary. —This paper is a first attempt at analyzing the strategic interactions 
that underlie coercive trade policy. We have studied trade coercion in settings where 
sender governments may show their resolve by demanding more concessions from 
target governments. We have seen how the temptation to exaggerate can reduce the 
likelihood of targets conceding. This problem is especially severe when the sender 
government is not (fully) committed to a multilateral dispute settlement  mechanism. 
Then, unbound by international commitments, the sender may make excessive 
demands which are unacceptable to the target. Institutions through which demands 
are channeled thus matter to coercion outcomes. In accordance with  empirical 
 evidence, our results indicate that full commitment to (even weak) multilateral trade 
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institutions makes trade coercion more effective in obtaining concessions from 
 target governments.
Mixed Strategies and the  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) > T ( γ _ ) Case.—The intuitions behind 
Propositions 1 and 2, as well as their proofs, rest on two assumptions: firstly, as we 
focus on pure strategy equilibria, the Home government is not allowed to  randomize 
between conceding and not conceding to the Foreign government demands; and 
 secondly, we concentrate on cases where  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) . Though these  assumptions 
ease the exposition, make our results sharper, and allow us to avoid equilibrium 
existence issues, we show in the supplementary online Appendix that, without them, 
our main conclusions remain intact. Indeed, allowing the governments to use mixed 
strategies while still assuming that  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) leaves the results unchanged. 
In the absence of the IO, a trade war is the only possible equilibrium outcome: an 
equilibrium in which the Foreign government obtains a concession with a positive 
probability would require some subset of types (including  γ _ ) to pool and, by the 
same logic as in the case of pure strategy equilibria, incentives to signal high levels 
of resolve would then lead the highest types in that subset to ( profitably) deviate by 
successfully demanding lower tariffs. Such profitable deviations become impossible 
in the presence of the IO if all types of Foreign government demand  τ io ≥ T( F 0 ) , 
as the Home government can always comply with the IO ruling. The possibility of 
randomization does not affect the strategic incentives that underlie Propositions 2 
and 3, which remain unchanged—except in the knife-edge case where  τ io is exactly 
equal to  T( F 0 ) .23
Assuming  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) > T ( γ _ ) creates equilibrium existence problems: there does 
not exist a pure strategy equilibrium in the model without IO, and existence of 
a mixed-strategy equilibrium requires additional conditions on the  W and  W ⁎ 
 functions (discussed in the supplementary online Appendix S3). Though less 
extreme than in the  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) case, the conclusion from the analysis of 
mixed-strategy  equilibria for the model without the IO is still a negative one: a trade 
war arises with positive probability in any equilibrium.24 More specifically, signal-
ing incentives again rule out successful demands by pooling types, and therefore, 
every equilibrium must have the following (partially) separating structure: there 
exists a threshold  γ ˆ ∈ ( γ _ ,  γ – ] for the Foreign government’s type such that every type 
 γ <  γ ˆ makes demand  T (γ ) which the (indifferent) Home government concedes to 
with a probability  α ( γ ) , where  α ( γ ) is a strictly decreasing function, and every type 
γ >  γ ˆ ends up in a trade war with probability one. It follows that a trade war cannot 
be avoided with certainty unless the realization of the Foreign government’s type is 
exactly equal to  γ _ , which is a probability-zero event.25 The analysis of the equilibria 
for the model with the IO generates the same conclusion as in the  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) 
case: if  τ io > T ( F 0 ) , then  τ io is the only possible outcome and a trade war never 
23 If  τ io = T ( F 0 ) , then there may also be equilibria in which the Home government, indifferent between 
 conceding to  τ io and a trade war, chooses a trade war with positive probability. 
24 Of course, there cannot be an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government end up in a trade 
war if  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) > T ( γ _ ) , as type  γ _ could profitably deviate by making a successful demand in  ( T ( γ _ ),  T  ⁎ ( γ _ )) . 
25 In the knife-edge case where  T  ⁎ ( γ _ ) = T ( γ _ ) , there can also be a pure strategy equilibrium in which type  γ _ 
is the only type of Foreign government that obtains a concession with positive probability. 
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occurs in equilibrium. The basic intuition behind this result is that: (i)  demanding 
lower tariffs to signal high levels of resolve is no longer a profitable  deviation 
from a pooling equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government demand 
 τ io ≥ T(  F 0 ) , as the Home government is better off complying with the IO ruling 
rather than conceding to lower tariff; and (ii) equilibria with a partially separating 
structure as above cannot exist in the presence of the IO, as the (partially) informed 
Home government prefers complying to its ruling  τ io > T ( F 0 ) rather than engag-
ing in a trade war with the highest types of Foreign government. If the Foreign 
government can choose between unilateral and multilateral coercion, then we obtain 
a counterpart of Proposition 3: in any equilibrium, a trade war occurs with positive 
probability whenever the Foreign government’s type exceeds  γ _ (which is itself a 
probability-one event). We thus conclude that, as in the  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) case, the 
IO can be effective in preventing trade wars despite its lack of enforcement power, 
and in particular, the Foreign government is more likely to obtain concessions from 
the Home government by using multilateral coercion rather than unilateral coercion. 
Moreover, allowing the Foreign government to choose between these two modes of 
coercion can make coercion less effective.
Beyond Trade Coercion.—Proposition 1 is reminiscent of the unraveling result 
obtained in disclosure games—e.g., Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).26 
Interestingly, however, while the unraveling phenomenon in disclosure games results 
from the privately-informed agents’ ability to reveal their types directly, the sort of 
unraveling of pooling equilibria in our unilateral-coercion game follows from the 
Home government’s inferences from the Foreign government’s actions. As we saw 
in Section III, criterion D1 implies that, in a putative pooling equilibrium, the Home 
government interprets deviations from a successful demand as certainly  coming 
from the highest pooling type, thus allowing the latter to effectively disclose its 
private information (and profitably deviate) by making more aggressive demands. 
Complete breakdowns have been shown to occur in other bargaining processes with 
adverse selection, but the agents’ failure to come to agreement (irrespective of their 
types) in those alternative settings stems from different mechanisms—e.g., rational 
expectations in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) or sequential offers in Vincent (1989).
Note that the logic of Proposition 1 can be extended to any bargaining or 
 contracting environments beyond trade dispute settlement that possess the 
 following key  properties: (i) a privately-informed party (the “sender”) makes a 
 take-it-or-leave-it offer  τ to another party (the “receiver”), which determines how the 
surplus  generated by an agreement would be split between the two parties; (ii) the 
receiver’s  benefit from any agreement is monotonic, say increasing, in the sender’s 
type,  γ ; and (iii) the relative cost to the sender of deviating from a successful offer  τ 
to a more demanding offer  τ ′ —measured by the ratio
  
[ Sender’s payoff under agreement τ ] − [ Sender’s payoff if no agreement ]   ____________________________________________________________      [ Sender’s payoff under agreement τ ′ ] − [ Sender’s payoff if no agreement ] 
26 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the analogy between the two results. 
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— is decreasing in her type. It is the latter condition, coupled with criterion D1, 
that leads to the “unraveling” of the pooling PBEs in which offers would be 
successful: as the highest pooling type has the lowest relative cost of deviating from 
τ to  τ ′ , the receiver is convinced that a deviation to  τ ′ must come from this type and, 
therefore, accepts  τ ′ . This makes the deviation profitable to the highest pooling type. 
Property (iii) typically holds in bargaining situations (lemons markets, international 
conflict resolution, …) where the proposer’s outside option improves with its type.
Research Avenues. —There are a number of research avenues opened up by 
our results, three of which we will briefly discuss. First, our positive theory of the 
impact of multilateral institutions on trade coercion outcomes naturally prompts a 
normative question: what would an optimal dispute settlement mechanism be in the 
presence of informational asymmetries? 27 Answering this question would require 
a richer framework, i.e., one that would further our understanding of the effects of 
settlement mechanisms both on membership in international trade institutions and 
on target governments’ policy choices that are likely to trigger coercive responses.
As we noted at the outset (see footnote 12), our analysis focused on coercion 
itself and not on its ultimate origin. It would be interesting to investigate why do 
 dissatisfied governments use coercion instead of potentially more efficient  bargaining 
approaches. Trade coercion typically involves two policy instruments: the target’s 
trade policy, which is the source of the sender’s discontent, and the sender’s policy, 
which is only used as a retaliation instrument. By focusing its demand on the former 
instrument, the sender government leaves out mutually advantageous agreements, 
which would be available if its demand would involve instead a combination of both 
instruments.
Finally, the mechanisms of trade coercion put forward in this paper can be 
 captured  with our simple one-period model, in which sender and target govern-
ments do not have to anticipate further dealings with each other. Consider a dynamic 
extension of this model in which, whenever the target would either concede to the 
sender’s demand or comply to the IO ruling, the same one-period game would be 
repeated. If the sender’s type were persistent across periods, as in Bagwell (2009), 
then governments would have to anticipate the future consequences of their choices. 
In particular, this would exacerbate the signaling incentives that arise in the one-pe-
riod model, especially in cases where there is no IO or the sender is only partially 
committed to the IO: the possibility of future interactions would increase the send-
er’s expected benefits from signaling high levels of resolve with more aggressive 
(unilateral) demands. In addition, repeated interactions would create reputational 
incentives for the target that could also lead to trade wars. Indeed, if the target’s 
type were also private information (and persistent over time), then it would have 
incentives to reject the sender’s demands, so as to be perceived as “tough” in future 
periods.28 But we leave this as a topic for future research.
27 Maggi and Staiger (2011) answers a similar question, but in a complete-information setting where states of 
the world are “vague” and subject to interpretation by contracting governments. 
28 Pelc (2010) informally discusses such incentives. 
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Mathematical Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we must show that: (i) in any equilibrium of the game 
without the IO, the Home government never concedes to the Foreign government’s 
demands; and (ii) there exists an equilibrium in which the Home government never 
concedes to the Foreign government’s demands.
CLAIM 1: Suppose that the Foreign government can only coerce unilaterally. In any 
equilibrium, the Home government never concedes to its demands.
PROOF: 
First of all, observe that only one demand can successfully be made in equilib-
rium. To see this, suppose that two different demands  τ 1 and  τ 2 are made successfully 
in equilibrium by types  γ 1 and  γ 2 , respectively. Assume without loss of generality 
that  τ 1 <  τ 2 . By definition of an equilibrium, type  γ 2 must find it profitable to 
make successful demand  τ 2 ; hence,  T  ⁎ ( γ 2 ) ≥  τ 2 >  τ 1 . But this implies that type γ 2 could profitably deviate by making claim  τ 1 :  W ⁎ ( τ 1 ,  τ 0 ⁎,  γ 2 ) >  W ⁎ ( τ 2 ,  τ 0 ⁎,  γ 2 ) .
Now, we establish the claim in two steps: (i) we first show that if a demand is 
successful in equilibrium, then it must emanate from a single type; and (ii) we then 
show that this is impossible in equilibrium:
 (i) We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that multiple types make a successful 
demand, say  τ , in some equilibrium. From our initial observation above, all 
the other equilibrium demands are unsuccessful. Let  Γ τ ⊆  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] be the set 
of types that demand  τ , and let  γ  sup ≡ sup  Γ τ (observe that, by assumption, γ  sup ∈  (  γ _ ,  γ – ]  ). By definition of a PBE, we must have  τ ≤  T ⁎ (γ ) for all γ ∈  Γ τ — otherwise, some type in  Γ τ could profitably deviate by making an 
unacceptable demand—and, therefore,  τ ≤  T ⁎ ( γ  sup ) . As  T ⁎ ( γ ) is a strictly 
decreasing function, this implies that  τ <  T ⁎ ( γ ) for all  γ <  γ  sup ; so that 
all types  γ <  γ  sup strictly prefer  τ to a trade war. Hence, in equilibrium, all 
types  γ <  γ  sup must make the unique successful demand  τ . Furthermore, 
by definition of a PBE, all types  γ >  γ  sup must prefer a trade war to 
 τ : τ >  T ⁎ (γ ) for every  γ >  γ  sup (recall that indifferent types choose 
to avoid a trade war). By continuity of  T ⁎ ( ⋅ ) , therefore, we must have 
 T ⁎ ( γ sup ) = τ . Being indifferent between  τ and a trade war, the type- γ  sup 
Foreign government chooses  τ . We have thus established that  Γ  τ = [ γ _ ,  γ  sup ] . 
 Confronted with demand  τ , the Home government—whose updated beliefs 
F τ assign a probability of one to the event “ γ ∈  [ γ _ ,  γ  sup ] ”— optimally 
chooses to concede in the equilibrium under consideration. As the distribution 
of types has full support on  [ γ _ ,  γ  max ] , this implies that  τ ≥ T ( F τ ) > T( γ sup ) . 
 Now take any tariff  τ ′ ∈ ( T ( γ sup ), τ) , and observe that no type of Foreign 
government demands  τ ′ in equilibrium. Indeed, by definition, all types in  Γ  τ 
demand  τ ≠ τ ′ . As for types  γ outside  Γ  τ , they must be greater than  γ  sup . 
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Therefore, if type  γ >  γ  sup demanded  τ ′ > T ( γ  sup ) > T (γ ) , then the 
Home government would concede, thus contradicting our previous result 
that only one demand can be successful in equilibrium. All the premises of 
Lemma 1 in the supplementary online Appendix are thus satisfied: when 
confronted with demand  τ ′ , the Home government believes that the Foreign 
government’s type is lower than  γ  sup with probability zero. As  τ ′ > T ( γ sup ) , 
the Home government concedes to demand  τ ′ (off the equilibrium path). 
As  T ⁎ ( γ sup ) > τ ′ , this implies that demanding  τ ′ is a profitable deviation 
for the type- γ  sup Foreign government, giving the desired contradiction. As a 
consequence,  Γ τ is either a singleton or an empty set.
 (ii) Suppose  γ τ is the unique type that makes a successful demand  τ in some 
 equilibrium. Bayesian updating implies that demand  τ fully reveals the type 
of the Foreign government. Therefore,  T( γ τ ) ≤ τ ≤  T ⁎ ( γ τ ) — otherwise 
either the Home government or the type- γ τ Foreign government could 
 profitably deviate from their equilibrium strategies. From our assumption 
that  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T( γ _ ) , this in turn implies that  γ τ ≠  γ _ . Now take any type γ <  γ τ . By assumption, a trade war occurs when the Foreign govern-
ment is of type  γ ( γ τ is the only type that makes a successful demand). 
As  T ⁎ ( γ ) >  T ⁎ ( γ τ ) ≥ τ , however, the type- γ Foreign government 
strictly prefers  τ to a trade war. It could therefore profitably deviate by 
making the successful demand  τ . Combined with (i), this proves that in 
any equilibrium all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful 
demands. ∎
CLAIM 2: There exists an equilibrium of the game without the IO, in which the 
Home government never concedes to the Foreign government’s demands.
PROOF: 
Let  k be a strictly positive number and consider the following strategy profile 
and beliefs: the type- γ Foreign government demands a tariff  τ k ( γ ) ≡ T ( γ  ) − k ; 
the Home government’s strategy when confronted with a demand  τ is to concede if 
and only if  τ ≥ T ( γ _ ) ; it believes that the Foreign government is of type  γ with prob-
ability one when confronted with demand  τ k ( γ ) , for all  γ ∈  [  γ _ ,  γ –] , and that it is of 
type  γ _ when confronted with any other demand.
It is readily checked that the Home government’s beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule 
whenever possible. By Lemma 2 in the supplementary online Appendix, they also 
satisfy Criterion D1. It also readily checked that, given these beliefs, the Home gov-
ernment’s strategy is a best response to the Foreign government’s: given its beliefs, 
accepting any offer below [resp. above]  T (  γ _ ) would make the Home government 
strictly worsen off [resp. better off ] than triggering a retaliatory trade war. Finally, 
as the Home government rejects any demand below  T( γ _ ) , the only possible devi-
ation for the Foreign government would be to make a demand  τ ≥ T(  γ _ ) . But, as 
 T(  γ _ ) >  T ⁎ (  γ _ ) ≥  T ⁎ (γ ) for all types  γ ∈  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] , such a deviation would not be 
profitable. ∎
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B. Proof of Proposition 2
We prove Proposition 2 in five steps. Steps 1 and 2 show that, in any 
equilibrium, either all types of Foreign government successfully demand  τ io 
or they all make unsuccessful demands. Step 3 shows that all types success-
fully demand  τ io in equilibrium if and only if  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) . Finally, Step 4 shows 
that a trade war never arises in equilibrium when  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) , and that all types 
obtain concession  τ io when  τ io >  T ⁎ ( γ – ) . Finally, Step 5 proves existence of and 
 characterizes equilibria when  τ io < T ( F 0 ) , showing that: all types of Foreign 
government fail to obtain a concession from the Home government, and the 
latter  never complies with the IO ruling—thus completing the proof of 
the proposition.
Step 1: If the Foreign government makes a successful demand in equilibrium, 
then this demand must be  τ io .
Consider an equilibrium in which a demand  τ is successfully made by a 
 non-empty set of Foreign-government types  Γ  τ . Let  F be the Home government’s 
updated beliefs after receiving this demand. Obviously,  τ is the only successful 
 proposal made in equilibrium—otherwise all types making the highest demands 
could profitably  deviate by making the lowest demand. As it is optimal for the 
Home government to concede to  τ , we must have  τ ≥  τ io .
Now suppose by contradiction that  τ >  τ io . As  T ⁎ is a decreasing function 
and indifferent players prefer agreements over disagreements, the set of types 
demanding  τ must be of the form  [ γ _ ,  γ ˆ] , with  γ ˆ ∈  [  γ _ ,  γ –] . We distinguish between 
two different cases:
   Case 1:  γ ˆ >  γ _ . In this case,  τ ≥ max{ T (F ),  τ io } ≥ T (F ) > T ( γ ˆ ) . 
As any other equilibrium demand  τ ˆ ≠ τ is unsuccessful, we must have 
τ ˆ < T ( F ˆ ) , where  F ˆ represents the Home government’s updated beliefs 
after observing  τ ˆ. Moreover, as any such demand emanates from types  γ > 
γ ˆ (and  T is strictly decreasing), we must also have  T ( F ˆ ) ≤ T ( γ ˆ ) . It fol-
lows that no demand in  (T ( γ ˆ ), τ ) is made on the equilibrium path. Now con-
sider a  deviation from  τ to  τ ′ ∈ (max{T( γ ˆ ),  τ io }, τ ) . By Lemma 3 in the 
supplementary online Appendix, reasonable beliefs  F ′ must assign zero 
probability to the event  { γ <  γ ˆ }  following demand  τ ′ . This implies that 
 T (F′ ) ≤ T ( γ ˆ ) < τ ′ , which in turn implies that demand  τ ′ < τ would be 
 successful. By definition of a PBE, this is impossible: all types in  [  γ _ ,  γ ˆ ] can 
profitably deviate.
   Case 2:  γ ˆ =  γ _ . In this case, demand  τ reveals that the Foreign govern-
ment’s type is  γ _ . As it is optimal for the Home government to concede to  τ , we 
must have  τ ≥ max {T ( γ _ ),  τ io } ≥ T ( γ _ ) >  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) . But this implies that the 
 type- γ _ Foreign government could profitably deviate by making an  unacceptable 
demand  τ ′ <  τ io (whether this leads to compliance with  τ io or with a trade war, 
it ends up strictly better off ).
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Step 2: In any equilibrium, either all types of Foreign government successfully 
demand  τ io or they all make unsuccessful demands.
From Step 1, to prove this statement, it suffices to show that, in any equilib-
rium, if some type successfully demands  τ io then all types do. We proceed by 
 contradiction: suppose that a non-empty subset of types  Γ io ≠  [  γ _ ,  γ –  ] make the 
only successful demand  τ io in some equilibrium. As  T ⁎ (γ ) is a strictly  decreasing 
function (and   indifferent types are assumed to prefer a successful over an 
 unsuccessful demand),  Γ io must be of the form  [  γ _ ,  γ ˆ ] with  γ ˆ ≥  γ _ .
Let  F represent the Home government’s beliefs when it receives demand  τ io . 
As it concedes to  τ io in equilibrium,  τ io ≥ max{ T(F ),  τ io } ≥ T(F ) . From 
our  initial assumption, there must be a type  γ ′ outside  [  γ _ ,  γ ˆ ] which makes an 
 unsuccessful demand, say  τ ′ , in equilibrium. Bayesian updating implies that the 
Home  government’s beliefs assign zero probability to the event  {γ ≤  γ ˆ }  following 
demand  τ ′ . As  T( ⋅ ) is strictly decreasing in  γ , this in turn implies that 
τ io ≥ T(F ) ≥ T( γ ˆ ) ≥ T(F′ ) where  F′ represents the Home government’s beliefs 
following demand  τ ′ . Hence, the Home government complies with the IO ruling 
after rejecting demand  τ ′ in this equilibrium, leaving the type- γ ′ Foreign govern-
ment indifferent between its unsuccessful equilibrium demand  τ ′ and the success-
ful demand  τ io . According to our indifference condition, it should then demand  τ io 
instead of  τ ′ .
Step 3: There is an equilibrium in which all types make a successful demand if 
and only if  T( F 0 ) ≤  τ io .
Necessity.—If all types of Foreign government demand  τ io in equilibrium, then 
the Home government’s beliefs when receiving this demand are given by  F 0 . As a 
consequence, we must have  τ io ≥ max{ T ( F 0 ),  τ io } ≥ T ( F 0 ) .
Sufficiency.—Suppose that  T( F 0 ) ≤  τ io , and consider the follow-
ing  strategy  profile and beliefs: all types of Foreign government demand 
τ io ; the Home   government concedes to (multilateral) demand  τ if and only 
if  τ ≥  τ io and always accepts the IO’s ruling; it maintains its initial beliefs 
F 0 if it receives demand  τ io , and believes that the Foreign government is of type  γ –
otherwise.
As  τ io ≥ T( F 0 ) > T( γ –) , the Home government’s beliefs ensure that 
it is always  optimal for it to comply with the IO ruling and to concede to 
demand  τ ≥  τ io from the Foreign government. Anticipating that it will get 
 payoff  W ( τ io ,  τ 0 ⁎) if it does not concede to the Foreign government’s demand, 
it is also optimal for the Home  government not to concede to any  τ <  τ io .
Given the Home government’s strategy, the Foreign government has two 
options: (i) to make a successful demand  τ ≥  τ io and thus get a  payoff of 
W ⁎ ( τ,  τ 0 ⁎, γ ) ; or (ii) to make an unsuccessful demand and thus get a pay-
off of  W ⁎ ( τ io ,  τ 0 ⁎, γ ) . As  W ∗ ( ⋅ ,  τ 0 ⁎, γ ) is a strictly decreasing  function 
for all  γ ∈ Γ , demanding  τ io is the best strategy for any type of Foreign 
government.
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Finally, it is readily checked that the Home government’s beliefs satisfy Bayes’ 
rule whenever possible. Moreover, by Lemma 4 in the supplementary online 
Appendix, they are reasonable.
Step 4: If  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) , then a trade war never arises in equilibrium. In addition, 
if  τ io >  T ⁎ ( γ – ) then all types of Foreign government make successful demands in 
any equilibrium.
Suppose that  τ io ≥ T( F 0 ) . To prove the statements above, we must first show 
that the Home government complies with the IO ruling whenever it rejects a 
demand from the Foreign government on the equilibrium path. To this end,  consider 
an  equilibrium—say  σ —in which some type of Foreign government makes an 
 unsuccessful demand. From Step 2, this implies that all types make unsuccessful 
demands. Let  T σ be the set of demands made by all types of Foreign government 
in  σ , and let  {  Γ τ } τ∈ T σ  be a partition of  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] such that all types in  Γ τ demand  τ in 
 equilibrium. Suppose first that the Home government rejects the IO ruling after 
rejecting any demand  τ ∈  T σ . Letting  F τ denote the Home government’s beliefs 
following demand  τ , this would imply that  τ io < T ( F τ ) for all  τ ∈  T σ ; contradict-
ing our assumption that  τ io ≥ T( F 0 ) .
Suppose now that  T σ can be partitioned into two non-empty, disjoint  subsets  T 1 
and  T 2 such that the Home government always concedes [resp. does not always 
 concede] to the IO ruling after rejecting any  τ ∈  T 1 [resp. any  τ ∈  T 2 ]. In 
 particular, observe that if a type  γ prefers the IO ruling  τ io to a trade war, then so 
do all types  γ ′ < γ (recall that  T ⁎ is a strictly decreasing function). As  σ is an 
 equilibrium, no type that makes a demand in  T 1 can profitably deviate by mim-
icking a type that makes a demand in  T 2 , and vice versa. This implies that there 
exists a threshold type  γ ˆ such that all types smaller [resp. larger] than  γ ˆ belong 
to  T 1 [resp. to  T 2 ]. This in turn implies that the Home government learns that the 
Foreign government’s type is lower [resp. greater] than  γ ˆ when it receives a demand 
 τ 1 ∈  T 1 [resp. a demand  τ 2 ∈  T 2 ]. As  W ̃ (γ ) is a strictly decreasing function, 
Bayesian updating then implies that  E  F  τ 1   [ W ̃ (γ )] ≥  W ̃ ( γ ˆ ) ≥  E  F  τ 2   [ W ̃ (γ )] for all τ 1 ∈  T 1 and all  τ 2 ∈  T 2 . However, in equilibrium, the Home government prefers 
τ io to a trade war after rejecting  τ 1 and (strictly) prefers a trade war to  τ io after 
rejecting  τ 2 ; that is
(A1)  W( τ io ,  τ 0 ⁎ ) ≥  E  F  τ 1   [ W ̃ (γ )] ≥  E  F  τ 2   [ W ̃ (γ )] > W( τ io ,  τ 0 ⁎ ), 
which is of course impossible. This establishes that, in equilibrium  σ , the Home 
government always complies with the IO ruling after rejecting any  τ ∈  T σ .
Now suppose that  τ io ≥ T( F 0 ) and  τ io >  T ⁎ ( γ – ) , and that there is an equilib-
rium in which some (and therefore all) types make unsuccessful demands. From 
Step 3 and the argument in the previous paragraph, we know that all equilibrium 
demands lead to the implementation of  τ io . This implies that demand  τ io must be 
 unsuccessful in equilibrium; otherwise all Foreign government’s types would be 
indifferent between their equilibrium unsuccessful demands and  τ io (and would 
therefore choose to demand  τ io ). This in turn implies that demand  τ io is followed by a 
252 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS AUGUST 2019
trade war; otherwise the Home government would be indifferent between  conceding 
and not conceding to  τ io and, therefore, would choose to concede. By definition of 
an equilibrium, no type of Foreign government can profitably deviate by demanding 
τ io (thus triggering a trade war); that is:  W ⁎ ( τ io ,  τ 0 ⁎, γ) ≥  W ̃  ⁎ (γ ) or, equivalently, τ io ≤  T ⁎ (γ ) for all  γ ∈  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] . As  T ⁎ ( ⋅ ) is a strictly decreasing function, this is 
equivalent to  τ io ≤  T ⁎ ( γ – ) , thus contradicting the assumption that  τ io >  T ⁎ ( γ – ) .
Step 5: If  τ io < T ( F 0 ) , then: (i) all types of Foreign government fail to obtain a 
concession from the Home government; and (ii) the latter never complies with the 
IO ruling. Such an equilibrium exists.
Suppose that  τ io < T ( F 0 ) . Part (i) is an immediate consequence of Steps 2 and 3. 
To prove part (ii), suppose toward a contradiction that there is an  equilibrium in 
which a non-empty set of types of Foreign government, say  Γ io , make  unsuccessful 
demands followed by compliance with  τ io . Observe that  Γ io ≠  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] , i.e., a 
 non-empty subset of types must make unsuccessful demands followed by trade 
wars. To see this, suppose instead that all types’ demands lead the Home  government 
to comply with  τ io . Letting  F τ denote the Home government’s beliefs following 
demand  τ , this would imply that  τ io ≥ T( F τ ) for all on-the-equilibrium-path 
demands  τ and, therefore, that  τ io ≥ T( F 0 ) ; thus contradicting  τ io < T ( F 0 ) .
By definition of an equilibrium,  γ ∈  Γ io if and only if  T ⁎ (γ ) ≥  τ io (other-
wise  γ could profitably deviate by mimicking a type outside  Γ io ). As  T ⁎ is a strictly 
decreasing function, there exists a threshold type  γ ˆ <  γ – such that  Γ io =  [  γ _ ,  γ ˆ ] . 
This implies that, when the Home government receives a demand  τ′ from a type 
outside  Γ io , its updated beliefs  F′ assign a zero probability to the event  {γ ≤  γ ˆ} . 
Hence,  T(F′ ) ≤ T( F τ ) ≤  τ io for any demand  τ made by a type in  Γ io . But this 
implies that the Home government should comply with  τ io after rejecting demand 
τ ′ , yielding the desired contradiction.
We now have to prove that such an equilibrium exists. We argue that the  following 
strategy profile and system of beliefs constitute an equilibrium: all types of foreign 
government demand  τ io ; the Home government concedes to demand  τ if and only 
if  τ ≥ T ( γ _ ) ; it never complies with the IO ruling; and it believes that the Foreign 
government’s type is  γ _ if the latter demands  τ ≠  τ io , and maintains its initial 
beliefs  F 0 otherwise.
To see that the Foreign government does not have a profitable deviation, observe 
that it could only change the equilibrium outcome (i.e., a trade war) by making a 
demand  τ ≥ T ( γ _ ) . As  T ⁎ (γ ) ≤  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T( γ _ ) , this would be unprofitable to all 
Foreign government’s types  γ ∈  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] .
As the Home government’s beliefs are  F 0 when it receives demand  τ io and τ io < T( F 0 ) , it is optimal for it not comply with ruling  τ io after rejecting demand τ io . This in turn implies that it is also optimal to reject demand  τ io . When it receives 
a demand  τ ≠  τ io , the Home government believes that the Foreign government 
is of type  γ _ . As  T ( γ _ ) > T ( F 0 ) >  τ io , it is optimal for the Home government to 
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trigger a trade war by rejecting the IO ruling. This in turn implies that it is a best 
response to concede to demand  τ if and only if  τ ≥ T( γ _ ) .
Finally, it is readily checked that the Home government’s beliefs satisfy Bayes’ 
rule whenever possible. Moreover, Lemma 5 in the supplementary online Appendix 
shows that they also satisfy criterion D1. ∎
C. Proof of Proposition 3
We prove Proposition 3 in two steps:
Step 1: There exists an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government 
coerce unilaterally and fail to obtain a concession.
Let  κ be a strictly positive number and consider the following strategy 
 profile and  beliefs: the type- γ Foreign government makes unilateral demand 
τ κ (γ ) ≡ T(γ ) − κ ; the Home government concedes to a unilateral demand τ if and only if  τ ≥ T ( γ _ ) ; it concedes to a multilateral demand  τ if and only if 
 τ ≥ max{ T ( γ _ ),  τ io } ; it complies with the IO ruling if and only if  τ io ≥ T ( γ _ ) ; 
it believes that the Foreign government is of type  γ when it is confronted with 
 unilateral demand  τ κ (γ ) , for all  γ ∈  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] , and that it is of type  γ _ when con-
fronted with any other demand.
To see that these strategy profile and system of beliefs constitute an  equilibrium, 
note first that the Home government’s beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule 
 whenever possible. Moreover, Lemma 6 in the supplementary online Appendix 
shows that they are reasonable. The Foreign government can only change the out-
come by  making either a unilateral demand  τ ≥ T( γ _ ) or a multilateral demand 
 τ ≥ max {T ( γ _ ),  τ io } . As  T ⁎ (γ ) ≤  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) ≤ max {T ( γ _ ),  τ io } , how-
ever, such deviations can only make it worse off. Finally, it is readily checked that, 
given its beliefs, the Home government’s strategy is a best response to the Foreign 
government’s.
Step 2: In any equilibrium, a trade war arises with a probability of one.
To prove this statement, we will establish in turn that in equilibrium: (i) if 
all types of Foreign government make unilateral demands, then the Home 
 government never concedes; (ii) if all types make multilateral demands, then the 
Home  government never concedes to those demands and never  complies with the 
IO ruling; and (iii) if some types coerce unilaterally and  others multilaterally, 
then all their demands are unsuccessful and lead to a trade war:
 (i) If all types coerce unilaterally in equilibrium, then by the same  argument 
as  in Proposition 1 they all fail to obtain a concession (all deviations 
 available in the game without IO are still available). Hence, a trade war 
ensues for all possible realizations of the Foreign government’s type.
 (ii) Consider an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government coerce 
multilaterally, and suppose (by contradiction) that some type’s demand does 
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not lead to a trade war. By the same argument as in Proposition 2, this implies 
that  τ io ≥ T ( F 0 ) and that all types’ demands lead to the implementation 
of  τ io . This in turn implies that  τ io ≤  T ⁎ ( γ –) — otherwise the type- γ – Foreign 
government could profitably deviate by making an unacceptable  unilateral 
demand  τ ′ < T ( γ –) . Lemma 7 in the supplementary online Appendix shows 
that, in such a case, reasonable beliefs must assign a probability of one to 
type  γ – following any (off-the-equilibrium-path) unilateral demand  τ ′ <  τ io . 
 Now consider a deviation to unilateral demand  τ ′ ∈ ( T ( γ –),  τ io ) (observe 
that  T ( γ –) < T ( F 0 ) ≤  τ io ). As the Home government believes that this 
demand emanates from the type- γ – government, it should concede to it. 
This makes the deviation profitable for all types of Foreign government.
 (iii) Consider an equilibrium in which  [  γ _ ,  γ – ] can be partitioned into two 
non-empty subsets  Γ 1 and  Γ 2 such that all types in  Γ 1 [resp.  Γ 2 ] coerce multilater-
ally [resp. unilaterally]. Proceeding by contradiction, assume that in this equi-
librium, a trade war is avoided for some realization of the Foreign government’s 
type. By the same argument as in Proposition 1, all types in  Γ 2 fail to obtain a 
 concession; so that a trade war occurs if  γ ∈  Γ 2 . Therefore, the types avoiding 
a trade war must be in  Γ 1 . By the same argument as in Proposition 2, tariff  τ io 
must then be implemented whenever the Foreign government’s type is in  Γ 1 . 
 By definition of an equilibrium, types in  Γ 1 cannot profitably deviate by 
mimicking types in  Γ 2 , and vice versa. As  T ⁎ (γ ) is strictly decreasing in  γ , 
this implies that there must be a type  γ ˆ ∈  ( γ _ ,  γ –) such that  γ ˆ =  ( T ⁎ ) −1 ( τ io ) 
and  Γ 1 =  [  γ _ ,  γ  ˆ ] . ( Note that  γ ˆ >  γ _ because  T ⁎ ( γ _ ) < T ( γ _ ) ; and γ ˆ <  γ – because by assumption  Γ 2 ≠ ∅ .) We distinguish between two 
different cases:
  (a)  If  T ⁎ ( γ ˆ ) ≤ T ( γ ˆ ) , then we have  τ io =  T ⁎ ( γ ˆ ) ≤ T ( γ ˆ ) < T(γ) for all 
γ <  γ ˆ. This implies that there must be a demand  τ emanating from 
some type, or some subset of types, in  Γ 1 such that the Home govern-
ment’s updated beliefs  F τ satisfy  T( F τ ) >  τ io . This in turn implies that 
it is optimal for the Home government to reject both demand  τ and 
ruling  τ io in order to trigger a trade war; a contradiction.
  (b)  If  T ⁎ ( γ ˆ ) > T ( γ ˆ ) , then  τ io > T( γ ˆ ) . Consider a unilateral demand 
τ ′ ∈ (T( γ ˆ ),  τ io ) . Observe that this demand is only made off the 
 equilibrium path: types  γ ≤  γ ˆ make multilateral demands, and types 
γ >  γ ˆ make unsuccessful demands (as  T(γ ) < T( γ ˆ ) < τ ′ for all 
 γ >  γ ˆ , the Home government would concede to  τ ′ if it emanated from 
types  γ >  γ ˆ in equilibrium). Furthermore, Lemma 8 (in the supple-
mentary online Appendix) shows that the Home government’s beliefs  F ′ 
when it receives unilateral demand  τ ′ must assign zero probability to the 
event  { γ <  γ ˆ } ; so that  T (F′ ) ≤ T ( γ ˆ ) < τ ′ (recall that  T (γ ) is strictly 
decreasing in  γ ). This implies that if some type of Foreign  government 
deviated to unilateral demand  τ ′ , then the Home  government would 
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concede. As  τ ′ <  τ io =  T ⁎ ( γ ˆ ) , this deviation is profitable to all types 
in  Γ 1 —this is again a contradiction. ∎
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